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Abstract 
 
This study uses an affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) to investigate how and 
when network structures generate “micro social orders.” Micro social order entails recurrent 
interactions, emotional reactions, perceptions of a group, and affective sentiments. The core 
theoretical argument is that micro orders, involving behavioral, cognitive, and affective 
dimensions, develop and are stronger to the degree that (1) actors engage in highly joint tasks or 
activities and (2) these tasks generate a sense of shared responsibility for the interaction 
outcomes. A laboratory experiment varies different forms of social exchange—negotiated, 
reciprocal, generalized, and productive— within a network structure, and offers strong support 
for the core expectation that productive forms of exchange generate the strongest micro order. 
Conversely, generalized exchange generates the weakest order, with negotiated and reciprocal 
forms in between. In general, productive exchange bolsters more exchange behavior, more 
positive feelings, perceptions of cohesion at the network level, and affective attachments to the 
network as a social unit. This research has broad implications for the conditions under which task 
activity promotes micro social orders that involve strong person-to-group ties (as opposed to 
person-to-person ties) and affective sentiments regarding the social unit. 
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It is generally understood that social structures pattern and shape social interaction and 
also that social interactions can generate, reproduce, and sometimes alter social structures (e.g., 
Emerson 1981; Giddens 1984; Stryker 1980; Turner 1978). When structures promote repeated 
interactions among the same individuals, people tend to form enduring relations or group 
affiliations (e.g., Emerson 1972a, 1972b; Homans 1950). If enduring relations or affiliations 
form, the social units that frame or make possible these relations—small groups, organizations, 
or communities—may become objects or realities for actors (Berger and Luckmann 1967). It is 
plausible that people develop ties to social units, as they interact with each other, and that these 
ties are a separable, independent force, distinct from the ties people have to each other (e.g., see 
Mead 1934; Parsons 1951; Tajfel and Turner 1986). In this article, we ask how and when social 
exchange processes generate per- son-to-unit ties that reflect micro social order. The affect 
theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) guides our theoretical and empirical analysis. 
The distinction between person-to-person and person-to-social unit ties has broad-
reaching implications for micro social order. Individuals may be bound to each other primarily 
by their interpersonal ties (e.g., friends, associates, or colleagues) or they may be conjoined 
primarily by some common tie to a social unit (e.g., its mission, values, or identity-affirming 
features). Parsons (1951) argues that theorizing the problem of social order involves an analysis 
of person-to-person and person-to-society ties as analytically distinct phenomena, a view traced 
to Durkheim ([1893] 1997). This distinction is also evident in Giddens’s (1984) structuration 
theory, Collins’s (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains, and contemporary theories of 
economy and society (Swedberg 2003). Moreover, the two kinds of ties thematically appear in 
theories of collective action (Benford and Snow 2000; Brewer and Gardner 1996; Prentice, 
Miller, and Lightdale 1994), embeddedness in economic transactions (Granovetter 1985, 1992; 
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Uzzi and Lancaster 2004), and structural cohesiveness and equivalence (Burt 1978; Moody and 
White 2003). In more general terms, person-to-unit ties are one aspect of the classic 
self/collectivity or individual/society dichotomy that has historically framed sociological theories 
of order. 
We approach the problem of social order in this article from a social exchange 
perspective (see Cook and Emerson 1978; Ekeh 1974; Homans 1950; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 
2000; Molm 2003a). Our analysis begins with an exchange network, defined as a set of possible 
or potential ties that limit and constrain who may exchange and interact with whom. A social 
exchange occurs when two actors give something of value to one another and receive something 
of value in return (Emerson 1972a, 1972b; Wilier and Anderson 1981). The outcome of interest 
is the micro social order that emerges from the patterns of interaction or exchange produced by 
the network. Micro social orders can be construed as emergent social units with group-like 
properties (e.g., see Lawler 2002; Lawler and Thye 1999); they can transform a network, 
crosscut groups or organizations, or be subdivisions within a larger social structure. The concept 
of a micro social order is implicit in theorizing that falls under the broad umbrella of 
“microsociology” (Scheff 1990; Stolte, Fine, and Cook 2001). Our purpose here is to theorize 
and empirically examine how and when micro social order develops among a set of actors who 
have structural ties to one another.  
We define a micro social order as a recurrent or repetitive pattern of activity (interaction, 
transaction, exchange) among two or more actors with four attendant dimensions: (1) actors 
exchange with or orient their behavior toward members of the social unit, (2) they experience 
global emotions from those interactions, (3) actors come to perceive they are a social unit, and 
(4) over time, individuals develop affective attachments to the larger social unit (Lawler 2002). 
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This concept of micro order interweaves collectively-oriented behavior (i.e., interactions with 
members or the group), positive affect (i.e., global emotions and affective attachments to the 
unit), and group perceptions (i.e., a sense of unity or cohesion). In these terms, a network 
becomes a micro social order to the degree that it generates recurrent patterns of exchange, a 
sense of network cohesion, and positive feelings directed at the actors and the overarching 
network. Together, these behavioral, emotional, and cognitive conditions imply that actors define 
themselves with reference to a larger social unit and are willing to act on its behalf. Micro social 
orders involve the development of a self-to- collectivity relationship. 
The affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) indicates that the structure of social 
exchange bears on the degree that micro social orders are likely to emerge from exchange 
processes. One important structural dimension is the connection between the giving behaviors in 
the transaction. Business or economic transactions tend to be contractual, negotiated, and 
explicit; the giving behaviors are closely connected and tit-for-tat. Exchanges in friendship 
relations tend to be implicit and occur over unspecified time periods; they lack the explicit, tit-
for-tat character of business transactions. Collective action involves person-to-collective 
transactions wherein a jointly-produced good generates benefits for those who contribute to its 
production. Public goods dilemmas and informal employer-employee contracts tend to fit this 
pattern. Finally, the structural connections between giving behaviors may allow actors to only 
give and receive from different others within a larger group or social structure (Bearman 1997; 
Malinowski 1922). Social exchange theorists have conceptualized these exchange structures as 
four forms of exchange referred to, respectively, as negotiated, reciprocal, productive, and 
generalized (Ekeh 1974; Emerson 1981; Lawler 2001; Molm 1994). Our theory hypothesizes 
that these forms of exchange differ in their capacity to produce micro social order. 
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Beyond social exchange theory there are a wide range of approaches that address some 
version of the stability and micro social order problem. Rational choice theories emphasize the 
role of monitoring, norms, and sanctions to redress the tension between individual and collective 
interests (Coleman 1990; Hechter 1987; Nee and Ingram 1998). Norms and sanctions emerge 
because of “externalities” produced by the widespread pursuit of individual self interest. Social 
constructionist theories stress the consensual meanings and interpretations that emerge 
endogenously among actors who engage in regular or repeated interactions (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Goffman 1959). Such meanings can “objectify” relations or groups, making 
them “realities” for actors. Identity theories emphasize how social interactions create and sustain 
shared self-other definitions associated with structural roles, social categories, and group 
affiliations (Burke 1991; Hogg 2004; Stryker 1980). Social exchange theories emphasize the role 
of trust and commitment in stabilizing relations (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005; Kollock 1994; 
Molm 2003a, 2003b). Although rational choice, social constructionist, identity, and social 
exchange theories approach the self-collectivity relationship in varied ways, they have 
overlapping and convergent themes. The affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) 
interweaves elements from each approach to incorporate an actor who experiences emotion or 
affect from exchange. 
Emotions are generally defined as positive or negative evaluative states with 
physiological, neurological, and cognitive features (Damasio 1999; Izard 1991; Kemper 1978). 
Our theorizing draws from work in psychology, sociology, and neuroscience. From psychology, 
emotions entail both a response to a stimulus (e.g., exchange with another) and a stimulus that 
itself produces cognitive work (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway 1994; Izard 1991). From sociology, 
cognitive work involves interpreting the meaning of emotions felt in the context of relationships, 
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situational norms, and self-other definitions (see Hochschild 1979; Kemper 1978; Smith-Lovin 
and Heise 1988; Thoits 1989). From neurobiology (Damasio 1999; LeDoux 1996), emotions 
induce organism-wide neurological effects that generate a rudimentary awareness of a self-
collectivity connection.1 Drawing on these literatures, everyday feelings from repeated 
interactions may foster the development of sentiments (positive or negative) about a social unit, 
and it is important to understand the conditions under which this is likely to occur. 
 
BACKGROUND: RELATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EXCHANGE 
 
Social exchange theories conceive of relationships in purely instrumental and 
transactional terms. A basic tenet of social exchange theory is that individuals form and maintain 
a relationship as long as the benefits from that relationship exceed those available elsewhere 
(Emerson 1972a, 1972b; Molm and Cook 1995; Wilier 1999). By implication, better offers or 
greater individual profits from alternatives break apart existing relations. This tenet is one reason 
that issues of power, reward allocation, and distributive justice have been central to the 
exchange-theoretic landscape. The exchange- network tradition, in particular, has focused on 
how network structures produce power gradients and stratification when the payoffs from 
exchange benefit some individuals at the expense of others (Cook et al. 1983; Emerson 1972a, 
                                                          
1 The organism-wide neurological effects mean that when an actor feels good he feels good all 
over; when an actor feels bad he feels bad all over. These effects are due to chemical 
secretions—such as dopamine, epinephrine, and oxytocin—that stem from different regions of 
the brain. Damasio (1999, 2001) indicates that these neurological secretions generate the “feeling 
of feelings” and suggests these are the foundation for consciousness, that is, a sense of the self 
juxtaposed to the external objects or events. For such reasons, neurological processes may 
promote awareness of or attention to social unit affiliations that are part of the context within 
which emotions occur. 
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1972b; Markovsky, Wilier, and Patton 1988; Skvoretz and Lovaglia 1995; Stolte and Emerson 
1977; Thye 2000a; Thye, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997; Wilier 1999). The relational aspect of 
social exchange is tied to the fact that structures tend to generate repeated exchanges among the 
same actors. Emerson (1972b) portrays this as a key difference between social and economic 
exchange. 
There are two general approaches to the relational aspect of social exchange. Emerson 
(1972b, see also Homans 1961) adopts an “individualistic” approach whereas Ekeh (1974; see 
also Malinowski 1922; Levi-Strauss 1969) offers a “collectivist” viewpoint. The individualistic 
approach starts with actors in a simple network structure who have rational-choice or behavioral 
incentives to exchange. Few, if any, assumptions are made about a larger group or social unit. 
Here, micro orders are emergent and necessarily tenuous as they are tied to individual self 
interest. Relations develop and prevail only to the degree that the incentives to exchange, 
preferences of actors, and structures of opportunity are stable. Relations as such emerge out of 
individualist conditions. In contrast, the collectivist approach assumes a larger social unit or 
group affiliation. Social exchanges as such are embedded within and reflect a cultural or 
normative order or framework (see Bearman 1997; Ekeh 1974). Here exchange takes on a more 
symbolic or expressive character and is driven by the cultural beliefs or norms of the larger 
social unit. In sum, the individualistic perspective draws attention to the exchange processes 
through which micro orders develop and are sustained, while the collectivist account emphasizes 
how exogenous conditions—structural or cultural—promote cooperation and minimize 
opportunism (see also Fukuyama 1995). 
The affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) further develops and bridges the 
individualist and collective approaches. It starts with and assumes an individualistic context but 
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then shows how actors develop a collective affiliation and affective ties. Our approach differs 
from other social exchange approaches in several ways (for reviews, see Lawler and Thye 2006; 
Thye, Yoon, and Lawler 2002). First, we argue that in social exchange there are social 
constructionist and identity processes that alter the foundation of relationships and groups, 
essentially transforming them from transactional (instrumental) to relational (expressive) entities. 
Second, we assert that this transformation is most likely when structures lead the same actors to 
interact or exchange repeatedly over time, a condition that is generally assumed in much of 
social exchange theory (Emerson 1981; Wilier 1999). Third, the mechanism through which this 
occurs is emotional or affective. We posit, and have found empirically, that solving an exchange 
problem is an accomplishment that produces positive emotions (see Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler 
and Yoon 1996); and under some conditions, actors associate these emotions with their relational 
or group affiliation (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998; Lawler et al. 2000). 
The relational consequences of repeated exchanges are most thoroughly documented in 
research on commitment in exchange relations (e.g., Kollock 1994). Commitment is generally 
defined as the tendency of actors to stay with and continue to exchange with those they have 
exchanged with in the past (Kollock 1994; Lawler and Yoon 1996; Molm, Takahashi, and 
Peterson 2000). Research reveals greater rates of commitment when actors face high uncertainty 
or risk (Kollock 1994; Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi 1999) and also when they have equal 
power or high mutual power and dependence (Lawler and Yoon 1996). There are two 
analytically-distinct interpretations for the emergence of commitment in social exchange: trust 
and affect. The trust interpretation asserts that individuals develop stable, ongoing relations in 
response to high risk and uncertainty (see Cook 2005; Kollock 1994; Molm 1994, 2003a). From 
this perspective, commitment is a strategy to reduce uncertainty in an unstable environment and 
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trust is the “glue” that binds together relations and groups (see also Fukuyama 1995; Yamagishi 
and Yamagishi 1994). The affect explanation contends that actors develop more stable, cohesive 
relations and groups if and when exchanges generate positive feelings that actors associate with 
the social unit (i.e., relation or group). Recent evidence suggests that uncertainty reduction and 
affect are “dual processes” that operate in parallel to promote stable, cohesive, ongoing exchange 
relations (see Lawler et al. 2000; Yoon and Thye 2000). We focus here on the role of affect. 
The theory of relational cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1996) was the first to draw attention 
to the role of affect in social exchange (see also Lawler and Thye 1999). The central argument is 
that relations with more equal power-dependence and greater mutual dependence produce more 
frequent exchange between pairs of actors in a network and this leads to relational commitments. 
These effects are indirect and operate through an endogenous causal chain: (1) more frequent 
exchange generates more positive feelings; (2) more positive feelings generate a perception of 
the exchange relation as a unifying (cohesive) force; and (3) greater perceived cohesion 
promotes commitment behavior (see Lawler and Yoon 1996,1998). Research has consistently 
supported this exchange-to- emotion-to-cohesion chain and also affirmed that power dependence 
effects on relational commitments occur indirectly, through this process (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 
1996, 1998; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000, 2006). The affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 
2001, 2002, 2006) addresses questions and issues that are complementary to relational cohesion 
theory, focusing not on conditions of power, but on determinants of social order across the forms 
of exchange. One question examined in the current research is whether the relational-cohesion 
process mediates the effects of forms of exchange on micro social orders. 
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Insert Table 1 
 
 
THE AFFECT THEORY OF SOCIAL EXCHANGE 
 
The affect theory of social exchange posits that the task jointness of the exchange or 
activity determines whether actors perceive the social unit as a source of their individual 
emotions or feelings. Actors attribute their individually-felt emotions to their relations or groups 
if the task is high in jointness; whereas if the task is low in jointness they attribute the emotions 
to their own or another’s behavior. Jointness varies along both objective and subjective 
dimensions. For example, a manager may objectively structure the tasks of a work group to be 
highly interwoven. The jointness of other tasks may depend less on objective conditions and 
more on the subjective framing of the task. To illustrate, consider childrearing by two parents or 
partners. If parental responsibilities are subjectively defined to be loose and overlapping, rather 
than divided precisely, “parenting” should foster a greater sense of joint responsibility. The key 
point is that both objective and subjective conditions are important. 
The theory makes a sharp distinction between global emotions that are immediately felt 
and specific emotions that emerge from subsequent interpretations of global emotions or 
feelings. This distinction is based primarily on Weiner’s (1986) attribution theory of emotion, 
but it also dovetails with Damasio’s (1999) notion that “feeling feelings” make salient that one is 
being affected in some way. Global emotions are involuntarily felt as a result of exchange or 
other social interaction. Feeling up/down, good/bad, or pleasure/displeasure are common 
examples. Specific emotions are associated with, or directed at, particular social objects such as 
self, other, or a social unit. Examples include pride in self and gratitude toward the other, shame 
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in self and anger toward the other, and affective attachments or detachments from a social unit. 
In the theory, the specific emotions directed at self, other, or a social unit emerge as actors 
experience and interpret the sources of their global feelings. The theory’s conceptual framework 
for these emotions is provided in Table 1. 
Theory and research in psychology indicates that people tend to attribute positive events 
(success) to themselves and negative events (failures) to others or the situation (Jones and Davis 
1965; Kelley 1967; Mezulis et al. 2004). The implication is that individuals, even those engaged 
in a joint task, will be more inclined to attribute group success to their own efforts and feel 
greater pride in self rather than gratitude toward the other. In the case of task failure, the 
predominant emotion would be anger toward one or more others rather than shame toward one’s 
self. These self-serving attributions suggest that it is difficult for repeated exchanges to generate 
positive sentiments about relations or groups. The affect theory of social exchange takes this as a 
challenge and specifies conditions under which social-unit attributions of emotion will overcome 
or mitigate self-serving biases to produce person-to-unit attachments. 
Specifically, the theory asserts there are structural (objective) and cognitive (subjective) 
conditions that determine when global emotions are attributed to social units. The primary 
structural condition is the degree that each individual’s contributions to task success (or failure) 
are separable (distinguishable) or nonseparable (indistinguishable). This comparison is informed 
by Williamson’s (1985) trenchant analysis of work conditions and governance structures. He 
argues that relational-team governance structures are common where work structures make it 
difficult to distinguish individual contributions, thus generating a sense of collective 
responsibility. One implication is that specialized or independent roles in a work setting make 
salient individual responsibility; whereas collaborative or overlapping roles make salient shared 
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or collective responsibility. For our purposes, this implies that structures of collective 
responsibility yield greater coordination or, in our terms, successful social exchange. Adopting 
these notions from Williamson (1985), the affect theory characterizes the objective structural 
condition as the nonseparability of task behaviors and contributions. 
The subjective dimension of jointness is the degree that the exchange task promotes a 
sense of shared responsibility for success or failure at exchange. If social exchange generates a 
sense of shared responsibility, actors are more likely to interpret their individual feelings as 
jointly produced in concert with others and thus attribute those feelings to social units. To 
illustrate, if employees in a work team perceive a shared responsibility for team success, positive 
feelings from doing the task are more likely to generate affective attachments to the team. On the 
other hand, if members share in the responsibility for team failure, the resulting negative feelings 
are likely to generate affective detachments from the group. Given this logic, there are two core 
propositions of the theory (Lawler 2001): 
 
Proposition 1: The greater the nonseparability of task activities and outcomes, the greater 
the perception of shared responsibility. 
Proposition 2: The greater the perception of shared responsibility for success or failure at 
a joint task, the more inclined actors are to attribute the global emotions to social 
units (relations, networks, or groups). 
 
These propositions constitute a causal chain wherein nonseparability of task activity 
generates perceived shared responsibility and, in turn, shared responsibility produces social unit 
attributions of emotions (i.e., affective attachments). A theoretical link can be drawn between 
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this causal sequence and that of relational cohesion theory. These two theories specify parallel 
yet interrelated processes. Whereas the affect theory theorizes the consequences of task non- 
seperability, the theory of relational cohesion theorizes the effects of total and relative power in 
the relation. All these factors capture and reflect types of interdependence that should yield 
greater exchange frequency. Nonseparability, as Williamson implies, involves more task 
interdependence, which enhances task coordination, reduces the cost of monitoring others, and 
yields a heightened sense of collective responsibility. High total and equal relative power, as 
documented in relational cohesion theory, entail greater outcome interdependence, which 
directly promotes concession making due to the profits at stake. Taken together, the overall 
implication is that task nonseperability should generate perceptions of shared responsibility and 
also activate the relational cohesion process linking exchange frequency- to-emotion-to-
cohesion. In this article, we empirically examine the link between the two theories by testing 
whether the relational- cohesion process mediates the effects of forms of exchange on affective 
attachments to the unit. 
To conclude, the strongest affective ties to the social unit occur when the structure of 
exchange entails high nonseparability and fosters a high sense of shared responsibility. 
Theoretically, these propositions are applicable to any structural condition that generates 
variation in the objective (nonseparability) or subjective (shared responsibility) conditions. We 
next apply these principles to the four forms of social exchange illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 
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Productive exchange involves a jointly-produced collective good wherein people 
unilaterally provide benefits to the group and receive benefit from it. Interdependence is high, yet 
there are coordination problems that need to be solved to generate the common good and allocate 
collective benefits. This implies an “assurance game” in which the largest payoffs are from 
mutual cooperation (Kollock 1998). Prototypes include a business partnership, coauthoring 
scholars, or a homeowners’ association working together to solve a community problem. In each 
case, individual agents cannot accomplish the desired outcome alone but stand to reap significant 
benefits from cooperation. Actors make individual contributions but these are interwoven in the 
joint products of their behavior. The affect theory asserts that nonseparability and perceptions of 
shared responsibility should be higher here than in other forms of exchange. The tendency to 
attribute emotions to the social unit (the network or group) should also be strongest in a 
productive exchange environment. 
Direct exchange occurs when two or more actors give directly to one another over time. 
There are two forms: negotiated and reciprocal. Negotiated exchange involves bargaining over 
the terms of an agreement. Through this process, actors develop a contractual agreement that 
allows them to provide benefits to one another (e.g., a salary for work or a price for a product). 
Agreements emerge from a process that entails offers, counteroffers, and mutual concessions. 
Actors’ contributions to exchange—their offers and concessions—are distinguishable, but there 
is a joint result produced by the explicit agreement on terms of the trade. The jointness of the 
exchange should be salient in negotiated exchange, and the sense of shared responsibility for the 
result should be relatively high, though lower than that found in productive exchange. Thus, 
nonseparability and shared responsibility should result in global emotions being attributed in part 
to the social unit, but somewhat attenuated relative to productive exchange. 
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Reciprocal exchange is similar to negotiated exchange, except that giving and receiving 
are sequential, unilateral acts separated by time and provided without explicit expectations of 
reciprocity. Patterns of reciprocity can emerge over time, however, if actors make their giving 
contingent on the prior giving by the other (see Molm et al. 1999). If A receives a unilateral 
benefit from B, A may feel obligated to provide benefits in return to B; and if A gives unilateral 
benefits to B, A may come to expect that B will later reciprocate (Gouldner 1960). Giving advice 
to a fellow employee, providing favors to a roommate, and inviting colleagues to dinner are acts 
that may initiate or become part of reciprocal exchanges. A major issue for actors in reciprocal 
exchange is risk or trust, that is, whether actors anticipate or expect reciprocal cooperative 
behavior from others (Molm 2003a, 2003b). Given that each act of giving is distinct, however, 
the jointness of exchange is not as explicit or salient as in productive or negotiated exchange. 
The degree of nonseparability and sense of shared responsibility, therefore, should be lower here. 
Generalized exchange is an indirect form of exchange that entails three or more actors 
who can give to (and receive from) one other, but here, givers and receivers are not matched in 
pairs. In an organization, a structure of generalized reciprocity among different departments 
exists if a department provides information to one other department but receives information 
from a different department. Other common examples involve acts of generalized reciprocity 
such as helping a stranded motorist or opening a door for a stranger. Like productive exchange, a 
structure of generalized exchange fosters high levels of interdependence and makes coordination 
a significant problem. Unlike productive exchange, giving behaviors are highly separable; and, 
all things being equal, acts of giving benefit are unlikely to generate much sense of shared 
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responsibility. Thus, based on the affect theory, generalized exchange poses important obstacles 
to micro social order.2 
To conclude, applying core propositions of the theory produces four general predictions 
for forms of exchange, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Productive exchange generates stronger perceptions of shared 
responsibility and stronger global emotions than do direct or generalized 
exchange. 
Hypothesis 2: Direct exchange produces stronger perceptions of shared responsibility and 
stronger global emotions than does generalized exchange. 
Hypothesis 3: Within direct forms of exchange, negotiated exchange produces stronger 
perceptions of shared responsibility and stronger global emotions than does 
reciprocal exchange. 
Hypothesis 4: The strength of a micro social order is ordered as follows across forms of 
social exchange: productive > [negotiated > reciprocal] > generalized. 
 
Hypothesis 4 has a number of subcomponents that correspond to the four dimensions of 
micro social order. It predicts the ordering of (1) frequency of exchange, (2) global positive 
feelings about the exchanges, (3) perceptions of network cohesion, and (4) affective attachments 
                                                          
2 Ekeh (1974) categorizes what we term productive and generalized under the same rubric 
(generalized) on the grounds that these are both collective forms involving high interdependence 
(see also Yamagishi and Cook 1993). While we acknowledge and accept Ekeh’s (1974) 
observation, the affect theory of social exchange suggests that different degrees of shared 
responsibility render these qualitatively different. 
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about the social unit across the four forms of exchange. The experiment to follow tests the 
impact of the forms of exchange on these dimensions of micro order. 
Other theoretical traditions predict different orderings among some of the forms of social 
exchange based on issues of risk, the expressive value of reciprocity, and trust (Ekeh 1974; 
Molm 2003a, 2003b). Molm and colleagues (2003a, 2003b; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007) 
predict and demonstrate empirically that reciprocal exchange fosters more commitment and 
stronger positive feelings about exchange partners (Molm et al. 1999; Molm et al. 2000) than 
does negotiated exchange. This suggests the opposite ordering for negotiated and reciprocal 
exchange (Hypothesis 3). Molm and colleagues also theorize that reciprocal exchange involves 
greater risk of nonreciprocity and more expressive value than negotiated exchange due to the 
latter’s explicit, binding character. As a result, giving behavior in reciprocal exchange is 
interpreted more positively by partners than giving in negotiated exchanges. Molm’s logic 
further suggests that because generalized exchange involves indirect, rather than direct, 
reciprocity, it generates the highest levels of expressive value (Molm et al. 2007). As such, she 
predicts that generalized exchange will produce even stronger positive feelings and commitments 
than both negotiated and reciprocal exchange (see Molm 2003a). The collectivist approach of 
Ekeh (1974) and the individualist approach of Molm (2003a, 2003b) both theorize that trust is 
higher in generalized than in direct exchange. Our research considers these alternatives in the 
context of the first simultaneous examination of all four forms of exchange identified in the 
exchange tradition.3 
                                                          
3 We do not claim a competitive test vis-a-vis the formulations of Ekeh (1974) or Molm (2003a). 
This study is designed to test implications of the shared- responsibility logic of the affect theory, 
examining micro social order across all four forms of exchange simultaneously. We assume 
somewhat different initial conditions (i.e., exchange partners need not exclude connected others) 
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Specific Emotions Toward Self and Other 
 
Based on Propositions 1 and 2, objective task jointness and the sense of shared 
responsibility determine whether social-unit or self-serving attributions are likely to emerge. This 
has implications for specific emotions directed at self and others. To the degree that individuals 
engage in social-unit rather than self-serving attributions, they should feel both pride in self and 
gratitude toward the other, following successful social exchange. That is, gratitude toward the 
other does not reduce the sense of pride in self, or vice versa. By comparison, if actors engage in 
self-serving attributions, they attribute positive results to their own efforts and pride toward self 
and gratitude toward others will thus be inversely related. Therefore, the forms of social 
exchange that promote stronger micro social orders should also generate more pride and more 
gratitude. 
The case of negative emotions is more complex. On one hand, as with positive emotions, 
when individuals fail to exchange and engage in social-unit attributions both anger (toward the 
other) and shame (toward the self) should be mitigated as the focus is on the social unit. Given 
the theory, this would lead us to conclude that negative emotions will be less likely to emerge 
within forms of exchange high on objective task jointness. On the other hand, if individuals 
engage in self-serving attributions, failures to exchange should generate anger toward the other 
but not shame toward the self. This would suggest that the mean level of anger will be greater 
than the mean level of shame. Overall, the theory suggests that the forms of exchange should 
reveal the following order for the specific emotions directed at self and other: 
                                                          
relative to these authors, and as such, we see our approach and those of Ekeh (1974) and Molm 
(2003a) as complementary. We return to these differences in the discussion section. 
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Hypothesis 5: The ordering of positive emotions directed at self (pride) and other 
(gratitude) across the forms of exchange should correspond with the ordering of 
objective task jointness: productive > [negotiated > reciprocal] > generalized. 
Hypothesis 6: The ordering of negative emotions directed at self (shame) and other 
(anger) across the forms of exchange should be the inverse of the ordering of 
objective task jointness: generalized > [reciprocal > negotiated] > productive. 
 
Mediating Processes 
 
The linkages between structure, interaction, and outcome are defining characteristics of 
exchange theories. A key issue is whether structures have direct or indirect effects on outcomes. 
Whereas Emerson (1972a, 1972b) and others (Wilier 1999; Markovsky et al. 1988) emphasize 
the direct effects of structure on outcomes, recent work reveals a shift in emphasis toward the 
mediating effects for structure. This is most clearly shown in research on commitment (Kollock 
1994; Lawler and Yoon 1996; Molm et al. 1999) that emphasizes the mediating roles of 
uncertainty reduction, trust, risk, and affect. Emotional mediation is central to the theory of 
relational cohesion, given its focus on the indirect effects of structural power on relational 
commitments through this causal chain: exchange frequency → positive emotions → cohesion 
(Lawler and Yoon 1996; Thye et al. 2002). We propose that objective task nonseperability 
unleashes the endogenous process of relational cohesion theory, thereby strengthening affective 
attachments to social units. This is based on the supposition that objective task jointness 
promotes more frequent exchange by promoting coordination and a sense of collective 
responsibility. In turn, frequent exchange fosters more global positive feelings about the 
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exchange tasks, as well as a greater sense of cohesion at the network level. Cohesion at the 
network level makes the network itself a relevant social object and possible target for affective 
sentiments. Thus, as a complement to Hypotheses 1 to 4, we test whether the endogenous 
relational-cohesion process mediates the impact of forms of social exchange on affective 
attachments, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 7: The effects of forms of exchange on affective attachments are mediated by 
the exchange-to-emotion-to-cohesion process, specified by relational-cohesion 
theory. 
 
To summarize, this article conducts the first explicit test of the affect theory of social 
exchange (Lawler 2001) simultaneously comparing the four forms of social exchange identified 
by exchange theorists (Ekeh 1974; Emerson 1972b; Lawler 2001; Molm 1994). In basic terms, 
the theory identifies structural (task nonseparability) and cognitive (perceptions of shared 
responsibility) dimensions under which social exchange generates emergent micro social orders 
at the collective or group level. Applied to the forms of exchange, the theory predicts that 
productive exchange will generate the strongest micro orders and generalized exchange the 
weakest, while the two forms of direct exchange (negotiated and reciprocal) will fall in between. 
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METHOD 
 
The Experimental Context 
 
The experiment, described below, created an interorganizational setting, in which three 
small, entrepreneurial firms have complementary strengths or niches and can reap benefits from 
an exchange of resources. Reflecting the four forms of social exchange, companies could 
explicitly divide profits from resources (negotiated); develop a pattern of giving resources to one 
another (reciprocal); partake in a joint-venture (productive); or give and receive from different 
actors (generalized). The setting was a three-actor, triadic network that varied only the form of 
exchange, as portrayed in Figure 1. 
Triads are a simple and straightforward network configuration for examining the 
emergence of a micro social order (Simmel 1964). We designed the networks to capture a 
situation where: (1) actors have equal power because the network of opportunities for exchange 
does not give any of them a structural advantage, and (2) each actor can exchange with any or all 
of the other actors in the network to whom they are connected. That is, on any given episode 
each can exchange with none, one, or both of the others.4 The actors are therefore “free” to 
construct any set or pattern of relations, which may involve varied rates or types of exchange 
                                                          
4 In the parlance of network exchange theory “null connections” are theoretically distinct from 
negative (exclusive) or positive (inclusive) connections (Brennan 1981; Wilier 1999). The vast 
majority of networks studied are negatively or exclusively connected (Molm and Cook 1995; 
Wilier 1999). Molm’s theory and research examines negatively-connected networks (e.g., Molm 
2003a, 2003b; Molm et al. 1999) and observes that the salience of conflict is greater in 
negotiated than reciprocal exchange. Our use of null connections lessens the salience of conflict 
across the forms of exchange because exclusion need not occur. We suggest that when conflict 
salience is reduced the theoretical process specified by Molm and colleagues (2007) will be 
attenuated. 
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with their prospective partners. Such networks are well-suited to studying emergent social 
processes and are similar to many real-world contexts where actors can create and sustain a set of 
noncontingent relations. Another advantage is that these networks afford a very straightforward 
way to compare the four structural forms of social exchange.5 
 
Design and Procedures 
 
A total of 192 undergraduate students at a Northeastern and a Southeastern university 
participated in the experiment for payment. The experiment consisted of a four condition, 
completely randomized design that manipulated the four forms of social exchange. In all, 64 
same- sex triads were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions (16 triads 
per cell; 10 female and 6 male). Because data were collected at two universities, the experiment 
counterbalanced gender and university affiliation within each experimental condition. 
Upon their arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to separate cubicles where they read 
written instructions. The instructions described the setting, which involved three small computer 
firms (Alpha, Beta, and Gamma) and indicated that each subject was the head of her respective 
company. Each was informed that the company specializes in the production of memory chips 
but lacks the technology to make microprocessors. Subjects were told they could acquire or 
receive such technology from the other companies. A diagram of the network was present in 
each subject room to show who could give valued resources to whom, thus subjects understood 
                                                          
5 Simultaneously comparing all four forms of exchange is complex. For instance, it may be 
impossible to instantiate an exclusively connected generalized exchange in a triad. Our approach 
minimizes the ancillary or extraneous differences among the conditions in accord with the 
requirements of our theory. 
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how each of the three participants could interact with the others. The instructions explained that 
there would be multiple “interaction episodes.” All interactions took place using desktop 
computers and subjects were anonymous. 
In each episode, subjects decided whether to give resources to one or more others, and 
these choices were made simultaneously by the three subjects. Productive, reciprocal, and 
generalized exchange involved a single choice, that is, to give or not to give. In the reciprocal 
and generalized exchange conditions, the choice was whether to unilaterally give to another; 
while in the productive exchange condition the choice was whether to give to a joint venture. 
The negotiated exchange condition entailed up to three rounds of offers and counteroffers in an 
effort to divide a pool of profits. To account for the three rounds of negotiations and equate this 
condition with the others on the number of interaction opportunities, there were a third fewer 
episodes (16) in the negotiated condition relative to all others (48).6 
All subjects were instructed to maximize the profits of their own companies and, in 
accord with related research (e.g., Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1996), they had 
information only on their own profit points during the experiment. They received a running 
cumulative total of their own profits updated after each exchange opportunity or episode (see 
Molm et al. 1999). Subjects were informed that their pay for the study was based entirely on the 
profits they acquired for their companies, and at the conclusion of the session, the number of 
points earned were converted to cash using a standard formula. 
                                                          
6 In all conditions there are 48 opportunities to interact (16 episodes X 3 rounds = 48 in 
negotiated; 48 episodes X 1 round otherwise). We chose this number of opportunities to ensure 
the study would generate reliable patterns of exchange, equate the four conditions in terms of 
time and number of observations in the statistical analysis, and maintain the involvement of the 
subjects. We used the results from a series of pretests at each university to guide our decision. In 
the case of negotiated exchange, prior research has found similar results with as few as 12 
episodes (Lawler and Yoon 1993) and as many as 20 episodes (Lawler et al. 2006). 
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Manipulation of Forms of Exchange 
 
Across all conditions, the benefit from exchange and the expected value associated with 
each relation were constant and equal. Under all four forms of exchange, the expected value of 
what actors could receive from each viable exchange behavior is 800 points. If actors chose not 
to give to or exchange with anyone, they received a default payoff of300 points (i.e., this 300 
points was forfeited if they gave to or exchanged in any viable relation). The default profit was 
part of the cover story designed to suggest that each company had the capacity to generate a flow 
of profit independent of the other companies. Because this default payoff was forfeited if they 
exchanged with or gave to another, it represents a constant and equal opportunity cost across the 
four experimental conditions. These costs and benefits were held constant at the relational level, 
that is, across all relations in all four conditions the gain from exchange is 800 points and the 
cost of exchange is 300 points.7 The specifics for each condition are given below. 
In negotiated exchange, actors negotiate with two prospective partners in the three-actor 
network at the same time, and each actor may reach an agreement with either, both, or neither 
partner. Each episode has up to three rounds of negotiation; in each round, actors could repeat 
their last offer or make a further concession by raising their offer. They could not retract earlier 
concessions. The negotiations continue until either an agreement is reached or the end of the 
third round. An agreement occurs if the sum of actors’ claims or demands is equal to or less than 
the total amount of joint profit on each relation (i.e., 1,600). The expected payoff per relation is 
                                                          
7 We used the default payoff to enhance the plausibility of the “cover story” and also to reduce 
the exogenous experimental pressure on subjects to exchange. This allows for more variation in 
giving rates, enhances our capacity to detect subtle differences in the emergence of micro order, 
and mirrors the opportunity or transaction costs associated with many exchanges outside the lab. 
It thus provides a conservative yet strong test of our hypotheses. 
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800 points given all positions are of equal power. If an individual is excluded from any 
exchange, they receive the default 300 profit points for that episode. 
The reciprocal exchange condition includes most of the elements and procedures Molm 
and colleagues used in their research on reciprocal and negotiated exchange (e.g., Molm et al. 
1999). Exchange relations can form, but they involve cross-episode, sequential giving, rather 
than a within episode explicit agreement as with negotiated exchange. In a given episode, every 
actor simultaneously decides whether to give resources (valued at 800 profit points to the 
receiver) to one or both of their partners. If they do not give to either, they receive the default 
payoff of 300 points, as in the negotiated condition. 
In the productive exchange condition, each subject simultaneously decides whether to 
invest 800 points in a common account. Resources flow to the account and benefits flow from it. 
This is similar to an assurance game in which the largest payoffs are from mutual cooperation 
(Kollock 1998). The payoffs from the joint venture are determined by the number who 
participate in the interaction. If only one person contributes, the 800 points are divided equally 
among the three actors such that each actor receives 266 points from the joint venture (of course, 
the two noncontributors also earn the 300 point default payoff). If two actors give, their total 
contributions (800 + 800 = 1,600 total) are multiplied by 1.5 to generate 2,400 points. This 
amount is then divided equally across the three such that each receives 800 profit points (again, 
the noncontributor also earns the 300 point default). If all three contribute, their total 
contributions (800 + 800 + 800 = 2,400) are doubled to yield 4,800 profit points. This amount is 
then divided equally across the three such that each receives 1,600. The payoff is maximal when 
all three actors contribute and this amount is consistent with maximal payoffs in other 
conditions. 
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In the generalized exchange condition, each subject can give to one other and receive 
from a different other. Individual contributions are structured such that A benefits B, B benefits 
C, and C benefits A (see Figure 1). An episode here consists of each subject simultaneously 
deciding whether or not to give resources to the contiguous other in the chain.8 To be consistent 
with the reciprocal condition and hold the relational payoffs constant, the points given to the 
other are valued at 800 profit points for the receiver.9 Also, as with all other conditions, if an 
individual decides not to give they receive the default payoff for that episode. 
 
Measures of Dependent Variables 
 
Our theory predicts the ranking across the forms of exchange for each empirical indicator 
of micro order: (1) the rates of giving in the network, (2) global feelings of pleasure/satisfac- 
tion, (3) perceptions of network cohesion, and (4) affective attachment to the network as a whole. 
We also measure specific emotions to test for the predicted ordering across the conditions. 
                                                          
8 In both reciprocal and generalized exchange conditions subjects were explicitly told they are 
giving 400 points that will double to 800 points for the receiver. This procedure has been used in 
related research on reciprocal (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2006) and generalized exchange 
(Yamagishi and Cook 1993) and we included it for that reason. It has no bearing on the 
incentives of actors. 
9 By definition, in generalized exchange with a single-commodity, such as our triadic-chain, an 
actor can benefit from only one other actor. We thus adjusted the pay schedule here so that the 
total monetary value is equated with the other conditions. The expected value of profit (800) is 
equated at the level of the relation across all four forms of exchange. This means, however, that 
in a given episode within the generalized exchange condition actors could receive 800 points 
total, whereas they could receive 1,600 points maximum in the other conditions (800 points x 2 
relations). To examine this, we ran an ancillary condition of generalized exchange in which 
subjects could receive 1,600 points (instead of 800). The substantive results across all four 
dimensions of micro order (giving behavior, global emotion, cohesion, and affective attachment) 
were nearly identical, and there were no significant differences between the two versions of the 
generalized exchange condition. These data are available from the authors upon request. 
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Behavioral Measures 
 
Proportion giving is the networkwide rate of giving behavior divided by the total number 
of opportunities (range = 0 to 1). This is the most comparable behavioral measure across all 
forms of social exchange. In productive exchange it is giving to a group, in reciprocal it is giving 
to one or two others, in generalized it is giving to an adjacent other, and in negotiated it is 
reaching agreement with one or two others.10 We analyze the proportion of giving across all 
episodes and also by round block (first half, second half) to test for effects over time. 
Profit difference is a control variable in the regression analyses testing the mediation 
hypothesis. This is measured at the network level as the average of the absolute difference in 
profits across the three relations. When all actors earn precisely the same profit this measure 
equals zero; when there is some profit differentiation the index equals a positive value. This 
measure essentially controls for the differences in the amount of rewards that actors receive over 
time. 
 
Questionnaire Measures 
 
The computer software administered three questionnaires: one at the midpoint, one near 
the end, and one at the end of the study. In the negotiated condition, the first questionnaire came 
after the eighth episode (after the 24th episode in the other conditions) and the second came after 
the 16th episode (after the 48th episode in all others). The measures on each questionnaire were 
                                                          
10 To illustrate, if each person in the reciprocal exchange conditions gave to only one other on 
every round, the proportion of exchange is .50; if they gave to both others on every round the 
proportion is 1.0. 
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based on the theorizing. Drawing on relational cohesion theory, we measured global emotions 
and perceived cohesion on the first questionnaire. We measured affective attachments on the 
third (post) questionnaire because the affect theory suggests they are an outcome. To test for 
changes in cohesion over time, we measured network cohesion on the second questionnaire. We 
also measured the specific emotions here because they follow the global emotions in the affect 
theory of exchange. 
To measure global emotions the first questionnaire asked subjects to “describe your 
feelings right now” along a series of nine-point semantic-differential items: pleased-displeased, 
happy-unhappy, satisfied-not satisfied, contented-discontented, and joyful-not joyful. We 
averaged the scores within the network to create a single networkwide index (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.93).11 
We measured perceptions of network cohesion on the first and second questionnaires. 
Subjects were asked to “describe the network along each of the following”: close-distant, coming 
together-coming apart, solid-fragile, cohesive-divisive, and converging-diverging. Again, we 
averaged scores across members of the network to create a single network index. Previous work 
(Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996) documents that global emotions and 
perceptions of either relational or network cohesion are distinct constructs and highly reliable 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .94). 
The second questionnaire also measured the four specific emotions. These measures 
asked subjects to describe their feelings on a single nine-point scale directed at themselves (in 
the case of pride and shame) or nine-point scales directed at each of the others (in the case of 
                                                          
11 For reasons outlined in Thye (2000b), we reported reliability estimates as weighted averages 
across the four experimental conditions. 
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gratitude and anger). The anchors for each Likert item were: proud-not proud, grateful-not 
grateful, angry-not angry, and shameful-shameless. 
At the end, subjects received a post questionnaire containing the measure of affective 
attachments to the group. The items (five) asked subjects how they feel about their relationship 
to the group, and they responded on the following nine-point scales: bad-good, attached- 
detached, disloyal-loyal, disconnected- connected, and negative-positive. We created network-
level scores by averaging individual ratings (Cronbach’s alpha = .90).12 Finally, as a check on 
the logic of the theory, a single item measured perceptions of shared responsibility as follows: 
“When satisfactory results were produced in the episodes, to what extent did you and the others 
share joint responsibility?” Subjects responded on a nine-point scale, from “not at all” to “very 
much.” 
 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The results are divided into three sections: (1) analyses of variance to assess the main 
hypotheses, (2) a supplemental repeated-measures analysis of variance to test for trends in rates 
                                                          
12 A confirmatory factor analysis indicates that affective attachment to the group is distinct from 
global emotions and relational cohesion. The best fitting model occurs when each of the three 
factors is treated as a distinct construct (chi-square = 385, df = 76). In comparison, the goodness-
of-fit index drops significantly when the three measures are treated as a single construct (chi-
square = 1325, df= 77). The best performing two-factor model occurs when relational cohesion 
is combined with affective attachment (chi-square = 373, df = 76). Together, this evidence 
suggests the three constructs are theoretically and empirically distinct. 
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of giving and network cohesion, and (3) ordinary least squares regression models to test the 
mediation hypothesis. 
 
Micro Social Order: Hypotheses 1 to 4 
 
We use one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) to examine the impact of the four 
structural forms of exchange on the four indicators of micro order: exchange frequency, global 
emotions, perceptions of network cohesion, and affective attachments to the social unit. Table 2 
contains the means, ANOVA results, and post hoc tests that control the overall Type I error rate. 
There are significant main effects of exchange structure on all four dimensions of micro 
order: the proportion of giving (F3 60 = 20.19, p < .001), the strength of global emotion (𝐹𝐹3,60 = 
21.21, p < .001), perceptions of network cohesion (𝐹𝐹3,60 = 21.24, p < .001), and affective 
attachments to the group (𝐹𝐹3,60 = 14.95, p < .001). Moreover, the post hoc tests find the exact 
same pattern for each variable. In every case, the productive exchange structure is greater than 
the two direct forms of exchange (negotiated and reciprocal), which are greater than the 
generalized-exchange structure. The only departure from the theory is that there are no 
significant differences between negotiated and reciprocal forms of exchange. 
The logic underlying the affect theory asserts that different structures of exchange 
promote different degrees of shared responsibility for the results of the interaction. An ANOVA 
on perceptions of shared responsibility reveals a significant main effect for exchange structure 
that affirms the expected pattern (𝐹𝐹3,60 = 14.54, p < .001; productive M = 7.9, negotiated M = 
6.6, reciprocal M = 6.2, and generalized M = 5.7). The follow-up tests dovetail with those for 
micro order. Productive exchange produces a greater sense of shared responsibility than do the 
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forms of direct exchange (negotiated and reciprocal), and the direct forms of exchange generate a 
greater sense of shared responsibility than does generalized exchange. Negotiated and reciprocal 
forms of exchange are not significantly different from one another, which may explain the lack 
of other differences between these forms. Overall, the results for shared responsibility (1) affirm 
a core proposition that enables the theory to make predictions for forms of exchange and (2) 
mirror perfectly the results for micro social order.13 
In sum, the results provide clear and consistent support for the affect theory. Productive 
exchange generates the highest rates of giving, the strongest positive emotion, greater 
perceptions of network cohesion, and the greatest affective attachment to the overall network. 
Generalized exchange produces the lowest levels (i.e., weakest micro order) on all of these 
dimensions. Productive exchange also generates the greatest sense of shared responsibility, 
whereas generalized exchange produces the least. The direct forms of exchange consistently fall 
between these extremes. The fact that generalized exchange produces weaker indications of 
micro order than do direct forms of exchange is contrary to some prior theorizing (Ekeh 1974; 
Molm 2003a). 
Although predicted, we find no difference between negotiated and reciprocal exchange. 
However, given Molm’s (2003a, 2003b) research showing that reciprocal exchange fosters more 
commitment than negotiated exchange, it is not surprising that the affect theory of social 
exchange fails here. We must note, though, that Molm’s (20003a, 2003b) negotiated < reciprocal 
                                                          
13 To further examine the role of shared responsibility, we regressed affective attachments on 
perceptions of shared responsibility, controlling for exchange frequency, profit differences, and 
the forms of exchange. The results indicate a significant impact of shared responsibility on 
affective attachments (B = .339,p < .01), as suggested by the affect theory. In the context of the 
results for the forms of exchange and micro order, this adds further support to the underlying 
logic of the theory. 
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prediction is also not supported, which raises a question about the conditions under which 
negotiated-reciprocal differences are likely to occur. We return to this issue in the discussion. 
 
Over Time Effects 
 
To further pursue the difference between productive and generalized exchange, we 
examined the trends over time for giving behavior and for perceived network cohesion using a 
repeated-measures analysis of variance. It is plausible that differences between productive and 
generalized exchange may occur early but then converge and “wash out” over time. For this 
analysis, we divided rates of giving into two time blocks (i.e., 24 episodes in each block for 
productive, reciprocal, and generalized; eight episodes each for negotiated) and analyzed the two 
measures of perceived cohesion (i.e., at the 24th and 48th episodes; and the 8th and 16th in 
negotiated exchange). Figure 2 shows the trends for giving behavior. 
The repeated-measures ANOVA for exchange (giving) behavior does not reveal an 
interaction effect between time block and exchange structure on giving behavior (𝐹𝐹7,120 < 1; p = 
n.s.). The differences across forms of exchange emerge early and remain relatively steady. A 
more refined analysis, dividing the blocks into four periods, also does not show an interaction 
effect between exchange structure and time (F< 1; p = n.s.). The upshot is that rates of exchange 
or giving behavior are relatively steady over time across all conditions. 
In contrast, the repeated-measures ANOVA for perceptions of network cohesion reveals a 
significant interaction effect (𝐹𝐹3,120 = 4.65, p < .01), along with the main effect already reported 
(𝐹𝐹3,120 = 31.64, p < .001). Figure 3 illustrates the pattern. Perceptions of network cohesion 
became stronger over time in productive exchange (Means = 6.27 to 7.18, 𝑡𝑡63 = 6.13, p < .001), 
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but they deteriorate in generalized exchange (Means = 4.60 to 3.42, 𝑡𝑡63 = 7.12, p < .001). 
Negotiated and reciprocal exchange generate similar levels of cohesion over time and there were 
no significant differences (Means = 5.79 to 5.44 in negotiated; Means = 5.78 to 5.56 in 
reciprocal). The fact that productive exchange produces a strengthening of network-level 
cohesion and generalized exchange produces a weakening of cohesion is consistent with the idea 
that productive exchange has greater potential to endogenously generate micro social order. 
 
Emotions Directed at Self and Other (Hypotheses 5 and 6) 
 
Table 3 shows the means and analyses of variance for specific emotions directed at self 
and others. These effects are generally consistent with Hypotheses 5 and 6. There are significant 
main effects for gratitude toward the others (𝐹𝐹3,60 = 23.51, p < .001), for pride in self (F3 60 = 
13.12, p < .001), for anger toward the others (𝐹𝐹3,60 = 19.85, p < .001), and for shame in self 
(𝐹𝐹3,60 = 15.79, p < .001). Productive exchange produces the greatest gratitude toward the others, 
the greatest expression of pride in self, and the lowest levels of anger and shame. In contrast, 
generalized exchange produces the least gratitude and the most anger toward the others, as well 
as a similar trend with respect to pride and shame toward self. 
 
 
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
 
 
Insert Table 3 
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Insert Figure 3 
 
 
 
Three other patterns are worthy of note. First, comparing generalized to each direct form 
of exchange, six of the eight differences are significant and support the theory. Generalized 
exchange fosters more anger and shame, as well as less pride and gratitude, than did reciprocal 
exchange. Pride and shame in generalized exchange, however, were not different from 
negotiated exchange. Second, contrary to the affect theory, negotiated exchange produces more 
anger and less gratitude toward the other than did reciprocal exchange. These findings support 
the implications of Molm’s (2003a, 2003b; Molm et al. 2007) research indicating that negotiated 
exchange produces less positive affect directed at the exchange partner. Third, there is no 
difference between anger and shame under generalized exchange and thus no evidence for self-
serving attributions therein. 
 
Test of Mediating Process (Hypothesis 7) 
 
To conduct an OLS analysis of the indirect effects of forms of exchange, we created a set 
of dummy variables to capture the four forms of exchange. We then regressed giving behavior, 
global emotions, and perceived network cohesion on these dummies. To make the analysis 
comparable to related research (Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1996), we included three 
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additional controls: profit differentiation, perceived predictability, and interest/excitement, an 
emotion used in relational cohesion research.14 Table 4 shows the results. 
First, recall that the ANOVA results in Table 2 establish that the form of exchange 
significantly impacts giving behavior. The left most equation in Table 4 indicates that giving 
behavior has the largest effect on global feelings of pleasure (Beta = .543, p < .001). Second, the 
central equation indicates that these global feelings measured at time 1 have a positive (though 
marginal) effect on perceptions of cohesion measured at time 2 (Beta = .221, p <. 10). Third, the 
right equation finds that perceived network cohesion has the largest effect on affective 
attachments (Beta = .453, p < .001).15 The first two findings replicate principles of relational 
cohesion theory. The third finding shows how these effects also mediate the path from exchange 
behavior to affective attachments as the affect theory would suggest. Importantly, the effects of 
exchange behavior on positive emotions are strong, as are the effects of network cohesion on 
affective attachments to the group.16 This confirms key junctures in the integration of relational 
cohesion principles into the affect theory of social exchange. 
                                                          
14 The measure of interest/excitement index is identical to that from prior research on relational 
cohesion (Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The index consists of items with the 
following anchors: enthusiastic-unenthusiastic, exciting-boring, motivating-not motivating, and 
interesting-not interesting. The measure of perceived predictability consists of Likert scale items 
with the following anchors: unpredictable-predictable, uncertain-certain, vague-clear, and 
ambiguous-unambiguous. 
15 The marginal effect for global feelings may be due to the lag between time 1 (when the 
emotions were measured) and time 2 (when cohesion was measured). If we substitute the time 1 
measure of cohesion for the time 2 measure, global feelings of pleasure have a sizeable, positive 
effect on the perceived cohesion (Beta = .301, p < .01) and the other results do not change 
significantly. This trend is consistent with prior research (Lawler et al. 2000; Lawler and Yoon 
1996). 
16 Also of note, the zero order correlations between giving in the first block of episodes and 
global emotions (measured at the end of this block) indicate that giving behavior has a 
significant correlation with positive emotions in productive exchange (r = .11, p < .01), and the 
correlations in reciprocal (r = .64, p < .01) and negotiated (r = .77, p < .001) are similar to those 
for productive exchange. However, with a generalized exchange structure, the correlation of 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Micro social orders emerge from and are sustained by a structure-interaction process or 
dynamic. Structure shapes who interacts with whom and how often. The resulting patterns of 
interaction in turn generate a realized social order, or stable set of ties among actors. The concept 
of micro social order, as we conceive it, captures the joint consequences of a “dialectic” between 
structure and interaction. Micro social orders lack the standard properties of full- fledged groups 
(i.e., group goals, norms, or hierarchical structure), yet they involve more than the minimal or 
purely “categorical groups” of social identity theory (e.g., Hogg 2001). In this sense, they occupy 
a space between purely cognitive groups and groups with explicit goals and organized activities. 
In this article, we analyze how and when structural forms of exchange within networks promote 
the emergence of micro orders at the network level. 
Social exchange theory developed in sociology as a decidedly micro tradition focused on 
how individuals interact and, in particular, on the rewards they provide to each other. Social 
exchange theory adopts an instrumental view of the human actor and a transactional view of 
                                                          
giving behavior and positive emotions is not significant (r = .24, p = n.s.). Under generalized 
exchange, there is no evidence for an effect of exchange (giving) behavior on positive emotions. 
Finally, we conducted a regression with giving proportion in the four episodes preceding the post 
questionnaire, and these results were generally consistent with the results for affective 
attachment—namely, perceptions of network cohesion had a significant effect on giving rate in 
the last four episodes (Beta = .295, p < .01). 
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social interaction (Blau 1964; Emerson 1972a, 1972b; Homans 1961; Molm and Cook 1995). 
These simplifying assumptions about actors and interaction are a source of theoretical strength, 
in part, because they enhance the capacity of exchange theories to address or be integrated with 
macro-sociological traditions or fields such as organizations (e.g., interorganizational ties), 
stratification (e.g., social inequality), or economy and society (e.g., social embeddedness) (Cook 
et al. 2005; Nee and Ingram 1998; Pfeffer 1981; Uzzi and Lancaster 2004). The affect theory of 
social exchange (Lawler 2001, 2002) begins with a different model of human actors, arguing that 
people are feeling, affective beings who form expressive attachments to relations and groups 
within which they interact and exchange rewards. Emotions are internal events that, in Bandura’s 
(1977) terms, are self-reinforcing, and in exchange-theory terms, are internal, self-generated 
rewards or punishments. The affect theory essentially connects the instrumental and rational 
components of action, which are assumed in the exchange tradition, to the emotional and 
expressive components assumed by sociological theories of emotion (e.g., Collins 2004; Heise 
1979; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990; Smith-Lovin and Heise 1988; Turner 2000, 2002). 
The unique and most fundamental question posed by the affect theory of social exchange 
is: Under what conditions do actors attribute their emotional experiences to a social unit? The 
social unit may be a relation, group, network, firm, organization, community, or even a society. 
The theory puts forth a general process that, in principle, should apply to any social unit of 
import to the interactions of actors. The theory contends that actors are likely to attribute their 
emotions to social units that organize or shape those tasks, especially if the tasks or activities are 
jointly undertaken and accomplished. Theoretically, these could be local, immediate units or 
larger and more distant units (see Collins 2004; Lawler 1992; Turner 2002; Yoon and Thye 
2002). In either case, social-unit attributions of emotion are important because they strengthen 
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person-to-group attachments and, insofar as these attachments have an emotional character, they 
make that unit an object of value. The argument is fairly straightforward: To the degree that 
actors infer shared responsibility from the structures of interaction, social unit attributions are 
likely and person-to-group attachments should flourish and grow. The result is more group-
oriented cognition, affect, and behavior than is implied by standard incentive or reward-based 
explanations. 
In this research, we applied these principles to four structural forms of social exchange 
found in the literature (Emerson 1972a, 1972b, 1981; Lawler 2001; Molm 1994; Molm and Cook 
1995): productive, negotiated, reciprocal, and generalized. The main prediction from the affect 
theory is that the strength of a micro social order will vary based on the degree that the task 
involves nonseparable (indistinguishable) contributions and produces a high sense of shared 
responsibility. Productive exchange should thus yield the strongest micro social order, whereas 
generalized should yield the weakest micro order. Both negotiated and reciprocal exchange 
should fall in between productive and generalized, and they do. Negotiated exchange, however, 
does not produce stronger micro social order than reciprocal exchange as we anticipated. 
Our results consistently support core predictions, except for the lack of difference 
between the negotiated and reciprocal forms. First, as expected, productive exchange generated 
the highest rates of exchange, the strongest feelings of pleasure, the greatest sense of network-
level unity or cohesion, and the strongest affective attachments to the network as a group. 
Second, generalized exchange produced the lowest rates of these phenomena. Third, across time, 
perceived network cohesion increased under productive exchange but declined under generalized 
exchange, suggesting the potential of the former to naturally generate micro orders. Fourth, and 
as expected, the two direct forms of social exchange—negotiated and reciprocal—were 
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significantly different from and fell between productive and generalized exchange on all of the 
micro-order dimensions studied here. As a whole, the results reveal a strikingly consistent 
pattern across all relevant dimensions or indicators of micro social order. 
The finding that generalized exchange produces the lowest proportion of giving behavior 
and the lowest perceived network cohesion is inconsistent with Ekeh’s (1974) theorizing and 
some related research on generalized exchange (e.g., Bearman 1997; Molm et al. 2007; 
Yamagishi and Cook 1993). Repeated opportunities to exchange in the generalized structure did 
not generate a high proportion of exchange behavior (giving) among members (see Buchan, 
Croson, and Dawes [2002] for similar results in a one-shot exchange). Ekeh’s (1974) collectivist 
concept of exchange, however, presumes a larger normative framework and extant person- to-
group ties within which exchanges occur. This may explain why generalized exchange produced 
a weak micro order in our study. Our experiment removed such factors given that our intention 
was to compare the capacity of the four forms of exchange to generate person-to-group ties, 
endogenously. In the collectivist framework, person-to-group ties are essentially reaffirmed or 
symbolized by local micro social orders. In the individualist framework, person- to-group ties are 
an emergent “collective” result of a structure-interaction dynamic. In this vein, our research 
identifies a process by which individualist conditions of exchange evolve toward collectivist 
conditions. 
We suspect that for generalized exchange to produce an emergent micro order, some 
form of exogenous “spark” or structural push is needed. Theoretically possible candidates 
include (1) a common group identity or affiliation (Tajfel and Turner 1986), (2) a norm of 
generalized reciprocity (Gouldner 1960; Nee and Ingram 1998), (3) cultural beliefs that foster 
generalized trust in others (Fukuyama 1995; Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998), (4) a sense of 
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individual accountability or responsibility (Fox and Guyer 1978; Jerdee and Rosen 1974), or (5) 
a lack of opportunity cost associated with giving behavior (see Molm et al. 2007).17 In this 
regard, our experiment suggests that, compared with other forms of exchange, the structural 
capacity of generalized exchange to generate emergent orders is lower, probably because, in its 
most abstract form, such a spark is lacking. Future research should theorize and investigate the 
conditions under which generalized exchange will generate weak versus strong micro orders.18 
The individualist (Emerson 1972a; Homans 1950, 1961; Thibaut and Kelley 1959) and 
collectivist approaches to social exchange make different assumptions about the initial 
conditions for social exchange. The key problem for the collectivist approach is to understand 
the ties and connections between the “local” exchange processes and a larger collective or 
institutional framework. Sustained exchange is not possible, or expected, without the larger 
exogenous framework. The individualist approach (Blau 1964; Emerson 1972a; Homans 1961; 
Thibaut and Kelley 1959) makes simplified and relatively sparse a priori assumptions about the 
structural context within which exchange takes place. Relations and groups ostensibly are built 
and sustained from the “ground up” by repeated social interactions (e.g., Homans 1950) made 
                                                          
17 Molm and colleagues (2007) report one experimental condition on generalized exchange using 
a cost not unlike our default payoff. They find that the rate of giving in generalized falls from .81 
to .41 when giving involves a cost. This is consistent with the rate of giving we report here (M = 
.32) and also that found in a recent replication (Triplett and Thye 2007) of our generalized 
exchange condition (M = .27). 
18 An alternative to the “spark” hypothesis is that generalized exchange produces weaker micro 
social order when the network ties entail null connections, that is, people can interact or 
exchange with anyone they are connected to. On the other hand, generalized exchange produces 
stronger micro order when the networks are exclusively or negatively connected. In the former 
(representing our study), people can exchange with up to two others under negotiated and 
reciprocal exchange but only one other under generalized exchange; whereas in the latter 
(representing the research of Molm and colleagues), negotiated and reciprocal exchange involve 
conflict because one party must be excluded. These structural conditions could account for the 
differences between our results for generalized exchange and those of Molm and colleagues. 
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possible by structural conditions. From our theory, exogenous effects operate through the shared-
responsibility mechanism. 
The only departure from the theory’s predictions is the lack of differences between 
negotiated and reciprocal exchange across the dimensions of micro order. Our prediction 
(negotiated > reciprocal) is based on the propensity for negotiated exchange to produce a greater 
sense of shared responsibility compared with reciprocal exchange. In Molm’s theory, reciprocal 
exchange has stronger effects than negotiated because the salience of conflict is lower in the 
former and people make more positive inferences about a partner who gives unilaterally as 
opposed to one who agrees to negotiated contract terms (Molm 2003a, 2003b). From our theory, 
the most plausible explanation is that the negotiated exchange condition did not generate a 
greater sense of shared responsibility. From Molm’s theory, it is possible that negotiated and 
reciprocal exchanges did not differ because the salience of conflict did not differ. Recall, 
however, that we have some evidence in support of Molm’s theory—namely, that reciprocal 
exchange produced more gratitude toward exchange partners (and less anger) than did negotiated 
exchange. 
Our interpretation is that “null” networks substantially reduced the salience of conflict 
difference between negotiated and reciprocal exchange because all actors can be included in all 
exchanges under both regimes. We thus found no differences in micro order between negotiated 
and reciprocal exchange because the conditions for such effects, specified by either theory, were 
not present. Neither shared responsibility nor the salience of conflict differed across these 
conditions. This interpretation leads to the hypothesis that differences between negotiated and 
reciprocal exchange are contingent on differences in either the salience of conflict or perceptions 
of shared responsibility. If only the former occurs, reciprocal forms of exchange should generate 
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stronger micro orders than would negotiated exchange. If only the latter occurs, negotiated 
exchange should generate stronger micro orders than would reciprocal exchange. If there are 
differences along both dimensions, the impact of reciprocal versus negotiated exchange is 
determined by the relative importance or weight people accord these differences. 
To summarize, this article shows how different forms of social interaction or exchange 
affect the emergence of a micro social order in a social network. Each form of exchange entails a 
distinct type of connection between the behaviors at the heart of social exchange processes. 
Productive exchange interweaves individual behaviors to generate a collective joint product. 
Direct forms of exchange either involve an explicit contract specifying what each actor is to give 
(negotiated) or an implicit contingency between unilateral acts of giving at different times 
(reciprocal). Generalized exchange involves a chain of unilateral acts of giving. Our research 
demonstrates that productive forms of exchange produce the strongest order at the micro level. 
Overall, our theory and research illuminate how structure-interaction dynamics can 
endogenously generate micro social orders and self-collectivity ties that are affectively-based 
and infused with expressive value. 
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